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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-2a-3(2)(c) as this case constitutes an appeal from
Spanish Fork Circuit Court on a civil matter.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether, as part of his disaffirmance of a contract made
during his minority, Defendant is required to compensate
Plaintiff for the depreciation and/or use-value of the property
which formed the basis for that contract?
As this issue is a question of law--i.e., whether Utah law
requires a disaffirming minor to return the adult party to his
pre-contractual status--this Court will review the lower court's
decision for correctness, applying a de novo review in which no
deference is granted to the trial court's ruling.

Ron Case

Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382
(Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The sole determinative statute in the present case is Utah
Code Annotated Section 15-2-2, and is set forth verbatim in the
Appendix at A-l.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
This case involves an action on a contractual debt by
Plaintiff/Appellee against Defendant/Appellant despite
Defendant's prior disaffirmance of the contract as one made
during his minority.

This appeal is from a granting of summary

judgment in behalf of Plaintiff against Defendant by the
1

Honorable Judge John C. Backlund, Fourth Circuit Court, State of
Utah, Utah County, Spanish Fork Department, awarding Plaintiff an
amount equivalent with the depreciation of the subject-matter
property, $1,160.00, plus interest and court costs.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Defendant/Appellant contracted with Plaintiff/Appellee for
the purchase of a 1974 Ford truck on October 5, 1990, while he
was yet a minor.

Plaintiff's Complaint at 1 (see Appendix at A-

2) . At the time of the contract, Plaintiff received $640 from
Defendant, with an additional $1,860 to be due three months later
on January 1, 1991.

Id.

Later, as all parties have already

agreed, Defendant appropriately disaffirmed his contract with
Plaintiff.

Id. at 2 (Appendix at A-3); see also Ruling of the

Court (Appendix at A-8).

Despite Defendant's disaffirmance of

said contract, however, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against
Defendant on May 13, 1991, seeking that the contract be enforced,
or in the alternative, that Plaintiff be compensated for the
depreciation and/or use-value of the truck while the truck was in
Defendant's possession.

Plaintiff claims that the truck had

depreciated to a value of $700 at the time of disaffirmance and
therefore sought $1,160 in damages, which is equal to the sum
due, $1,860, less the $700 residual value of the truck.
Plaintiff Motion For Summary Judgment at 4 (Appendix at A-7).
Negotiations between Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant's
attorney ensued for some time after Plaintiff's Complaint was
filed, until Defendant filed a Motion For Summary Judgment And
2

Return Of Garnished Wages on January 26, 1993. No response was
had on this Motion until Plaintiff's attorney filed his own
Motion For Summary Judgment on April 1, 1993, requesting that
Plaintiff be compensated for the diminished value of the truck at
the time of its return to Plaintiff.

Circuit Court Judge John C.

Backlund issued a Ruling granting Plaintiff's Motion For Summary
Judgment on April 12, 1993. Judge Backlund held as follows:
The Court finds there is no genuine dispute
as to plaintiff's claim for damages in the
sum of $1,160.00. While defendant, being a
minor, exercised his right to disaffirm the
contract, he violated his obligation to
promptly return the vehicle in as good a
condition as when he received it. This he
failed to do.
See Appendix at A-8.

It is from this Ruling and ensuing Order

granting Plaintiff $1,160 plus costs and interest that Defendant
appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The only dispute before this Court is whether Defendant is
responsible for returning Plaintiff to Plaintiff's precontractual status. Defendant is not so liable.

Despite the

fact that other states may have gone in other directions, Utah
statutory and case law unequivocally holds that a minor is not
liable to the adult party of a contract for the depreciation
and/or use-value of the property which formed the subject matter
for the contract.

Therefore, in the present case, Defendant

cannot be held liable to Plaintiff for the depreciation of the
truck which Defendant had contracted to buy from Plaintiff.
Instead, Defendant is actually entitled to a return of the
3

consideration which he paid Plaintiff as a down-payment on the
truck.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT APPROPRIATELY DISAFFIRMED HIS CONTRACT
WITH PLAINTIFF.

It is clear from the record that Defendant has appropriately
disaffirmed his contract with Plaintiff.

The requirements for

disaffirmance pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 15-2-2 are
simple and have been met by Defendant in the present case.

In

order to disaffirm, a minor must (1) disaffirm the contract (2)
in a reasonable time and (3) restore to the other party all money
or property received by him by virtue of the contract and
remaining within his control.

These requirements, as is clear

from Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment and the Court's
Ruling, have been met in the present case.
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment does not raise the
issue of ineffective disaffirmance.

Instead, Plaintiff's Motion

admits,
All facts related above are not disputed by
either party. The Defendant was a minor when
he entered into the contract, and disaffirmed
before the age of majority. However, in this
matter, the Defendant obtained the use of a
vehicle without revealing his age to the
Plaintiff, utilized that vehicle, damaged the
vehicle, and when the vehicle was no longer
operative, attempted to escape his
responsibility.
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment at 2 (see Appendix at A5).

Thus Plaintiff's claim assumes effective disaffirmance and

claims that, despite the disaffirmance, Defendant remains liable
4

for the depreciation and/or the value of the vehicle's use during
Defendant's possession of that vehicle.
The lower court's logic is a little more difficult to
follow, but it nevertheless makes clear that no dispute exists as
to whether Defendant complied with the Utah Code Annotated
Section 15-2-2 in his disaffirmance.

The court stated that,

ff

[w]hile defendant, being a minor, exercised his right to

disaffirm the contract, he violated his obligation to promptly
return the vehicle in as good a condition as when he received
it."

See Appendix at A-8. Thus the lower court likewise found

that Defendant appropriately "exercised his right to disaffirm
the contract" but agreed with Plaintiff that Defendant had a duty
to return Plaintiff to his pre-contract status.
As the decision granting Plaintiff's Motion For Summary
Judgment, from which this appeal is made, is based solely on
Defendant's alleged duty to return Plaintiff to his precontractual status, that is the sole issue before this Court.
And, as will be shown, such a duty imposed upon a disaffirming
minor is in direct contravention to Utah law.
POINT II
THE ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT GOES AGAINST
ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW.
As already mentioned, the lower court imposed upon Defendant
a duty to "return the vehicle in as good a condition as when he
received it."

See Appendix at A-8. Clearly, however, the Utah

Legislature has opted to not impose such a duty.
Utah Code Annotated Section 15-2-2 permits a minor to
5

disaffirm contracts that are not for necessaries and thereafter
not be held thereto.

This section imposes an obligation upon the

minor to "restore[] to the other party all money or property
received by him by virtue of said contracts and remaining
his

control

at any time after attaining his majority."

15-2-2 (emphasis added).

within
U.C.A. §

Thus the statute clearly requires only

that the property remaining within the minor's control be
returned to the other party.

In the present case, Defendant

complied with this requirement when he returned the truck to
Plaintiff.

However, this requirement was apparently read and

understood by the lower court as imposing a duty upon the minor
to restore all property in its original
simply not the case.

condition.

This is

In fact, such a reading of the statute

effectively renders the disaffirming right nugatory.
Contrary to the lower court's ruling, the Utah Supreme Court
has held that under Utah's statute a minor may disaffirm his
contracts even if the property he has received has become
worthless and the return thereof does not make the other party
whole.

Blake v. Harding, 54 Utah 158, 180 P. 172 (1919).

The

Blake court continued by stating that to hold that a minor may
not "disaffirm and recover if the property he has received has
become worthless . . . is to impose the duty upon the infant to
place the other party to the contract in exact status quo.

To so

hold is to disregard and misapply the purpose of the law."

180

P. at 174.

Consequently, Blake held, a disaffirming minor is not

required to compensate the adult party for any losses the adult
6

may have suffered as a result of the disaffirmance.
The Utah Supreme Court has echoed its holding in Blake in
Merchants' Credit Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 Utah 364, 230 P.
1017 (1924), in which the court likewise held that a minor who
has squandered property during his minority is not required to
restore it in order to effectuate disaffirmance.

And# in a case

somewhat similar to the present, the court held that a minor
could not be held liable to a seller for damages resulting from
the minor's disaffirmance of a contract to purchase a housetrailer.
(1962).

Harvey v. Hadfield. 13 Utah 2d 258, 372 P.2d 985
In so holding, the court stated, "[0]ur statute cannot

be tortured to support the defendant's contention[] that the
disaffirming minor must compensate him for damages he may have
incurred."

Id. at 987.

Consequently, Utah law, as established by statute and
relevant case law, clearly indicates that a minor does not have
the obligation to return the other party to his pre-contractual
status.

Instead, the minor must merely return to the other party

that part of the consideration "remaining within his control at
any time after attaining his majority."

U.C.A. § 15-2-2.

Therefore, in the present case, Defendant complied with Utah
statutory and case law by returning the truck to Plaintiff.
Defendant did not have the duty to return the truck in a better
shape than it was in at the time of the disaffirmance; nor did
Defendant have the duty to compensate Plaintiff for the
depreciation and/or rental value of the truck for the time in
7

which Defendant possessed the truck.

Instead, as stated in

Blake, "an adult, in dealing with a minor, assumes all the risk
of loss."

180 P. at 174.

In addition to the clarity of Utah law on the point, public
policy likewise supports the rule as it now stands.

Utah's

courts have recognized the long-standing "responsibility of our
courts to . . . safeguard [minors'] rights until they have
attained their majority and thus presumably have the maturity of
judgment necessary to deal with opposing parties on equal terms
. . ."

Harvey, 372 P.2d at 986. Until such time, "[i]t is fair

to assume that because of their immaturity they may lack the
judgment, experience and will power which they should have to
bind themselves to what may turn out to be burdensome and
longlasting obligations."

Id.

"Accordingly, adults dealing with

minors must be deemed to do so in an awareness of the privilege
the law affords the minor of disaffirming his contracts."

Id.

In the present case, therefore, Plaintiff is deemed to have
been aware of the protection the law affords a minor.

Plaintiff

proceeded to enter into a contract with a minor despite that
protection.

Therefore, any losses which Plaintiff may have

suffered as a result of that contract are likewise his to bear,
and Defendant does not have the duty to compensate him for those
losses.

Consequently, Defendant cannot be required to compensate

Plaintiff's claimed losses of $1,160, which has been calculated
as the amount still owing on the contract after Defendant's
disaffirmance minus the current market value of the truck.
8

Defendant recognizes that some other states have followed a
minority rule that differs somewhat from Utah law.

For example,

in the lower court, Plaintiff relied on Arizona and Idaho
decisions to support his contention that a disaffirming minor is
required to account for the benefit he has received from the
adult party.

However, reliance on such cases is misguided

because, first, Arizona does not have a statute on point, and
second, while Idaho does have a relevant statute, it is entirely
different from Utah's. Therefore, Utah's statutory and case law,
while perhaps different from those of other states, is
controlling in the present case and mandates that Defendant not
be required to compensate Plaintiff for Plaintiff's losses.
POINT III
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A RETURN OF THE CONSIDERATION
HE FURNISHED TO PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PRESENT CONTRACT.
Defendant is clearly entitled to his money back.

As the

Court in Harvey held, "The plaintiff minor having disaffirmed the
contract [he] is entitled to the return of his money."
at 9 87.

372 P.2d

And as the Court in Blake implied, a minor who becomes

dissatisfied with his contract can undo the deal and get his
consideration back.

180 P. 172. Moreover, in neither of these

cases was the minor's right to a refund conditioned on his
returning the adult to his pre-contractual status.

Similarly, in

the present case, Defendant has disaffirmed the contract and is
entitled to a return of the money he spent in consideration of
the void contract, namely $640, regardless of the fact that
Defendant does not have the duty to return Plaintiff to his pre9

contractual status.
CONCLUSION
It has been agreed by Plaintiff and by the lower court that
Defendant appropriately disaffirmed his contract with Plaintiff.
However, the lower court has erroneously granted Plaintiff's
Summary Judgment Motion requiring that Defendant compensate
Plaintiff for damages resulting from the disaffirmance.
Consequently, the lower court's granting of Plaintiff's Motion
For Summary Judgment should be reversed, and the lower court
should be ordered to enter judgment in the amount of $640 for
Defendant.
Respectfully submitted this

¥

day of , MH^.^lfx.O

, 1993.

Respectfully submitted,

DEAN N. ZABtflSKIE
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
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APPENDIX

Utah Code Annotated Section 15-2-2

15-2-2,

Liability for necessaries and on contracts-Disaffirmance

A minor is bound not only for reasonable value of
necessaries but also by his contracts, unless he disaffirms them
before or within a reasonable time after he attains his majority
and restores to the other party all money or property received by
him by virtue of said contracts and remaining within his control
at any time after attaining his majority.

A-l

Pages A-2 through A-3: PlaintifPs Complaint

BRET B. HICKEN 5391
TAYLOR, BAKER & HICKEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
275 North Main
P.O. Box 288
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
(801) 798-3574
oooOooo
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT
oooOooo
LARRY SWALBERG,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,

v.
TODD HANNEGAN
2741 West 170 North
Provo, Utah
84601
Defendant.

Civil No.
oooOooo-

COMES

NOW

the

Plaintiff

and

Complains

against

the
y

Defendant and for cause of action alleges:
1.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County. \r

//

2.

The Defendant is a resident of Utah County.

3.

The amount in question is less than $10,0007~

4.

On October 5, 1990, the Plaintiff entered into a

written agreement with Defendant wherein Defendant purchased a 1974
Ford truck from the Plaintiff.
5.

Terms of the agreement were that Defendant paid the

sum of $640.00 on October 5, 1990.

The balance of $1,860.00 would

be paid by January 1, 1991.
6.

The

written

agreement

further

stated

that

the

Defendant would not receive title to the truck until the balance
was paid and that Defendant took the vehicle "as is".
Page 1 of 2

_
.. ^. n . ~ n
,^
Appellant's Brxef Page A-2

7.
years old.

At the time of the agreement, the Defendant was 17

Plaintiff had no knowledge of this fact and assumed the

Defendant had reached the age of majority.
8.
#

The Plaintiff has made demand for payment or return

of the truck

from

the Defendant

Defendant has refused.

on several

occasions

and

the

He stated that he was a minor at the time

of the contract and is, therefore, not responsible.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands Judgment as follows:
1.

For

Judgment

in

the amount

of

$1,860.00, which

represents the balance due and owing; or, in the alternative that
should

the

Defendant

contract
return

be

the

determined

vehicle

to

to
the

be

voidable,

Plaintiff

and

that

the

that

the

Defendant be responsible for a reasonable cost for having used said
vehicle.
2.

For attorney's fees and costs of Court incurred in

bringing this matter.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just in the premises.
DATED this 13

day

of May.

^

BRET B. HICKEN
TAYLOR, BAKER & HICKEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

Page 2 of 2
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Pages A-4 through A-7: PlaintifPs Memorandum
in Support of PlaintifPs Motion
For Summary Judgment

Bret B. Hicken 5391
BAKER & HICKEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
40 South Main - Suite 10
P.O. Box 306
Spanish Fork, UT 84660(801) 798-1800

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT
LARRY SWALBERG,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. 913000020
TODD HANNEGAN,
Defendant,
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Larry Swalberg, by and through
his attorney, Bret B. Hicken, and hereby submits the following
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment.
FACTS
On October 5, 1990, the Defendant purchased the 1974 Ford
truck from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was unaware that Defendant
was a minor.

Defendant contracted to purchase the vehicle for a

total purchase price of $2,500'. 00.

Of that sum, $640.00 was paid

from Defendant to Plaintiff, with the balance of $1,860.00 to be
paid at a later date.

Prior to paying the balance of the money,

Defendant contacted the Plaintiff and indicated he would not honor
the contract, and further refused to return the vehicle.
The vehicle was later returned pursuant to an order of

- 1 Appellant's Brief Page A-4

the court, but had been severely diminished in value.
ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate in a situation where
there are no material facts at issue. All facts related above are
not disputed by either party.

The Defendant was a minor when he

entered into the contract, and disaffirmed before the age of
majority. However, in this matter, the Defendant obtained the use
of a vehicle without revealing his age to the Plaintiff, utilized
that vehicle, damaged the vehicle, and when the vehicle was no
longer operative, attempted to escape his responsibility.
To allow the Defendant to take advantage of the Plaintiff
in this fashion is unconscionable.

The appropriate principal is

stated in 12 A.L.R. 3d §1174, pg. 1182; "In several jurisdictions,
the absolute immunity of an infant from contract liability has been
modified to the extent that in an action for recovery of a
disaffirming

minor's

payments, the

courts

have

allowed

the

Defendant merchant an offset for the amount by which the property
is diminished or depreciated while in the minor's possession." It
goes on further to state that page 1187; "The courts in several
jurisdictions have permitted the Defendant vendor, in an action
brought by a minor to recover payments that have been made under a
disaffirmed contract, to recap an allowance for the reasonable
rental value or value of the use of the subject matter of the
contract while it was in the minor's possession."
The above principal should apply in the case before the
court.

At the time the Defendant took possession of the vehicle,
- 2 Appellant's Brief Page A-5

it was worth $2,500.00

(the purchase price agreed to by the

Defendant).

property

When

the

was

returned,

it was worth

approximately $700.00 (see attached Affidavit of Randy Brailsford,
general manager of Smith Auto Ford).
Such a drastic reduction in value took place while the
property was in the hands of the Defendant, and it should be his
responsibility.

The bulk of case law, as stated by Defendant in

his memorandum, requires the Defendant to "restore the property to
the merchant." Certainly the $700.00 unworking vehicle returned to
the Plaintiff was not the same vehicle purchased by the Defendant
for $2,500.00.
The Court, in Valencia vs. White, 654 P. 2d 287, 174 Ariz.
139, (Ariz. App. 1982), reviewed a similar question, in a case
where a minor contracted for repair of trucks in his ownership.
Upon reaching the age of majority, he disaffirmed the contract.
The Court stated that upon disaffirming, the minor was required to
pay any benefits received in order to return both parties to the
status quo.

The Court further stated; "Upon reaching the age of

majority, the Defendant is required to account for any and all
benefits he received."
Additionally, the Court in Clark vs. Stites, 404 P. 2d
339, 89 Idaho 191 (Idaho 1965), held that:

"Notice of a decision

of minor over 18 years old to disaffirm a contract is not the only
requirement to accomplish a complete disaffirmance; the minor must
also restore consideration to the party, or pay its equivalent."

- 3 Appellant's BricSf Page A-6

CONCLUSION
The Defendant received a vehicle worth $2,500.00 from the
Plaintiff. When the Defendant disaffirmed, he returned the vehicle
worth $700.00 to the Plaintiff.

This does not constitute a

restoration of property on behalf of the Defendant.
It is reasonable that this Plaintiff be granted judgment
in the amount of the diminution of value of the property in
question.
Summary judgment should be granted in this matter on
behalf of the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,160.00 (the remaining
sum due of $1,860.00, less the $700.00 value of the truck) plus
reasonable amount of attorney's fees incurred in bringing this
matter.
Respectfully, the Plaintiff requests relief as mentioned
above.
'-?

DATED this - /

day of X " ^ ^ '

, 1993,

BRET B. HICKEN,
Attorney for the Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Dean N. Zabriskie, 3507 N.
University Ave., Suite 370, Jamestown Square, Hanover Building,
Provo, UT 84604, this

/

day of A/A/?/J

/L//-/KM//

SECRETARY
- 4 -

Appellant's Brief Page A-7

, 1993.

/JMA

Page A-8: Ruling of the Honorable Judge
John C. Backlund

RECEIVED
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

APR

1 3 1993

SPANISH FORK DEPARTT'BIT

LARRY SWALBERG
Plaintiff
RULING
CASE NO. S13000020

vs

TODD HANNEGAN
Defendant

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Plaintiff is

entitled to Summary Judgment in the sum of $1,160.00 plus interest and
court costs. The Court finds there is no genuine dispute as to plaintiff's
claim for damages in the sum of $1,160.00. While defendant, being a minor,
exercised his right to disaffirm the contract, he violated his obligation to
promptly return the vehicle in as good a condition as when he received it.
This he failed to do.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order and Summary
Judgment consistent herewith.
DATED:

April 12, 1993

BY THE COURT:

"d^i^y
C^^^^JL
-itsfis
/—:' CIRCUIT JUDGE
Appellant's Brief Page A-8

/

~cr^

FILED

DEAN N. ZABRISKIE #3599
Attorney for Defendant
3507 North University Avenue
Jamestown Square, Suite 370
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-7680

SEP 13 1993

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LARRY SWALBERG,
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
TODD HANNEGAN,

Docket No.

930313 CA

Defendant.

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of the Appellant in the above entitled action to
Bret B. Hicken at 40 South Main, Suite 10, Spanish Fork, Utah
84660 in an envelope postage prepaid this

.0

1993 addressed as follows:
Bret B. Hicken
40 South Main, Suite 10
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660

//9

7
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE

day of September,

